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Abstract 
 
This paper examines organisational inhibitions in relation to addressing occupational fraud. 
The a priori assumption would be if an organisation discovers occupational fraud it would 
deal with it. However, this research illustrates, drawing upon 24 semi-structured interviews, 
two case studies and participant observation, a range of avoidant rationalisations 
constructed by representatives of organisational victims to justify not tackling occupational 
fraud. These rationalisations bear great similarity to the rationalisations constructed by 
offenders and the paper argues they constitute a theory of differential rationalisation. The 
research may have wider relevance to explaining why organisations fail to deal with other 
negative behaviours. 
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Introduction 
 
“Bad men need nothing more to compass their ends, than that good men 
should look on and do nothing.” John Stuart Mill, 1867. 
 
This paper is concerned with occupational fraud, where employees defraud their employer. 
It is a problem that most organisations experience and one which would be expected they 
would want to address (ACFE 2016; Gottschalk and Tcherni-Buzzeo 2017). This paper, 
however, will show that many managers in organisations do not address the problem and 
use a variety of rationalisations to justify their inaction, which sometimes amounts to 
positive opposition to any intervention. These rationalisations are similar to the 
rationalisations which fraudsters use to self-justify their acts.  
 
Rationalisation was first recognised by Ernest Jones (Jones 1908), a prominent psychoanalyst 
and contemporary of Sigmund Freud. He described it as a mental distortion which produces 
a false explanation of behaviour with a “plausible ring of rationality” that accords with the 
individual’s normative expectations as “it bears a special relation to the prevailing opinion of 
the circle of people most significant to the person concerned” (Jones 1908). Rationalisation 
theory has emerged as a pivotal principle in the explanation of deviant or immoral behaviour 
within identity theory (Turner 2013: 338), cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger 1957; 
Murray, Wood and Lilienfeld 2012), groupthink theory (Janis 1973), convenience theory 
(Gottschalk 2017) and social learning theory (Bandura 2004). A few studies have focused on 
identity management in relation to legal activities and occupations which are socially 
stigmatised, however the majority of studies are concerned with illegal behaviour (Evans, 
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Forsyth and Foreman 2003). It is a core paradigm within criminology where it has collected 
two additional descriptors: neutralisation theory (Sykes and Matza 1957) and accounting 
theory (Goldstraw-White 2012; Azarian and Alalehto 2014). 
 
Both Sutherland (1940) and Cressey (1953) recognised the role of rationalisation in the 
aetiology of crime. Sutherland’s differential association principle arose from his research into 
criminal sub-cultures (Sutherland, Cressey and Luckenbill 1992:88). It is an offender-focused 
social learning theory which explains how criminal neophytes are eased into their nefarious 
ways by association with criminals (Sutherland et al. 1992:93). At its core is the idea that 
criminality is learnt from others, including the motives, attitudes and the rationalisations 
which justify engaging in criminal acts. On the other hand, Cressey’s research describes the 
pathway to criminality in the absence of learning from criminal associates. The Cressey 
(1953) model asserts that lone occupational fraudsters must construct their own 
rationalisations to neutralise the psychological dissonance stimulated by the inconsistency 
between their planned actions and normative standards. 
 
Following Cressey a number of studies have been undertaken to examine the rationalisation 
phenomenon (Benson 1985; Coleman 1987; Daly 1989; Dhami 2007; Gill 2005; Goldstraw-
White 2012; Klockars 1974; Leasure 2016; Liddick 2013; Minor 1981; Piquero, Tibbetts, and 
Blankenship 2005; Scott and Lyman 1968; Stadler and Benson 2012; Sykes and Matza 1957; 
Zietz 1981). These rationalisations can be approximately divided into two categories: 
externalised blame which lay the fault with others and internalised justifications which tend 
to acknowledge the accusation but justify the behaviour and diminish personal blame by 
attenuating its pejorative quality. The externalised group includes denial of victim, denial of 
injury, condemnation of condemnors, higher loyalty, denial of responsibility (Sykes and 
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Matza 1957), unworkable laws, normal behaviour (Benson 1985), unnecessary laws, duress 
(Scott and Lyman 1968), entitlement from exploitative employers (Coleman 1995; Ditton 
1977; Mars 1973), and, in the context of extremism, higher moral authority (Liddick 2013). 
The internal justifications include interpreting embezzlement as an intention to borrow 
money (Cressey 1953), the metaphor of ledgers (Klockars 1974), uncharacteristic behaviour 
(Benson 1985) and the defence of necessity (Minor 1981). 
 
The inference that can be drawn from theory is that countering rationalisations should be an 
effective component of crime reduction strategies (Nettler 1974; Cressey 1986). Sellers and 
Akers (2006) disagree, suggesting such an approach would have little practical value because 
offenders would innovate new creative excuses. It is an oddly fatalistic argument which may 
hold for those with sociopathic personalities or those so pressed by powerful motivations 
that they are determined to ignore countervailing narratives and values. However it offers 
opportunities within the controlled environment of organisations where ordinary people 
respond to cultural values which are susceptible to management influence and direction 
(Brown and Trevino 2006; Dukerich et al. Vollrath 1990). Klenowski (2012) suggests that 
organisations introduce workshops that focus on the consequences of white-collar crime 
and which teach “counterlinguistic phrases” to offset the rationalisations. Another approach 
is to address the exploitative characteristics of organisations, which provide some 
justification to the rationalisations, and ensure staff are fairly treated and remunerated 
(Coleman 1995; Gill and Goldstraw-White 2012:24; Hollinger and Clark 1983; Mars 1973, 
1974). With a critical glance to the machinations of the financial sector, a number of 
scholars have also highlighted the need to predicate salary incentives on ethical behaviour 
rather than solely on self-serving profit outcomes (Brown, Tevino and Harrison 2005; 
Huisman 2016; Prechel 2016). 
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Over the six decades since Cressey’s ground-breaking thesis, occupational fraud has 
attracted little scholarly attention, and related work has predominantly followed Sutherland 
and Cressey by focusing on the offender for aetiological explanations. Original empirical 
research that examines the context and role of the organisation is very rare. There are 
numerous practitioner texts (for example Comer 2003; Giles 2012; Vona 2008; Wells 2007) 
which provide practical advice on preventing fraud and responding to incidents. There are 
also frequent references in the literature to the influence of organisational culture and the 
“tone-from-the-top” (Holloway 2012). However there is an absence of research into the 
relative effectiveness of the various prevention methods, and there is very little empirical 
analysis of the cultural conditions which stimulate occupational fraud. Business ethics 
scholars, such as Trevino and Weaver (2003), undertake laudable research into the 
determinants of the general ethical performance of organisations, but it is not specifically 
related to employee fraud. 
 
Earlier cultural explorations included Kemper (1966) who postulated that employee 
deviance within organisations is stimulated by the behaviour of line managers. He identified 
two types of tone-from-the-top mechanisms. The first, reciprocal deviance, is fostered by a 
revenge motive through employees being badly or unfairly treated. The second is parallel 
deviance whereby employees copy the behaviour of superiors. In a rare excursion into the 
organisational context, Gerald Mars’ ethnographic studies revealed reciprocal deviance in 
hotel and dock workers: the working conditions enabled the employees to view 
occupational theft as a morally justified entitlement due from exploiting employers (Mars 
1973, 1974). Similarly Ditton (1977) demonstrated the causal connection between a toxic 
culture in a bakery and part-time criminality. His ethnographic observations demonstrated 
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how employees, having been trained to deceive customers to the advantage of the business, 
are stimulated by harsh working conditions to use those skills to defraud both the 
customers and their employer for their own ends. The corrupt culture of the bakery 
enabled the employees to neutralise immorality of their actions as normal behaviour. 
 
Greenberg (1990) supplemented these studies with a rare natural experiment into wage 
inequity and organisational justice. The experiment involved an American company which 
was forced to reduce wages temporarily in two of its three plants due to the loss of two 
large manufacturing contracts. Greenberg found that employee theft increased in the two 
affected plants, but was significantly higher at the site where the workers received only a 
cursory explanation for the wage cut with no apology or expressions of remorse. Hollinger 
and Clark’s (1982, 1983) large scale survey and interview study involving 47 US 
organisations found that employee deviance is positively correlated with job dissatisfaction: 
employees who felt exploited were more likely to engage in acts of theft or fraud against 
their employers in order to correct perceptions of inequity or injustice. 
 
This paper explicates one of the themes which emerged from a research programme that 
set out to explore why organisations do not prevent occupational fraud, that is, fraud 
committed by employees against the employer rather than corporate fraud perpetrated on 
behalf of the employer (Clinard and Quinney 1973:188). White-collar scholars sometimes 
describe causation in cultural terms related to the criminogenic nature of the capitalist 
corporation (Braithwaite 1985; Coleman 1992). The focus of this enquiry is the 
criminogenic characteristics of the organisation which lead to its own victimhood. There is 
an absence of cogent, primary research into how organisations, or more precisely 
responsible persons in organisations, avoid tackling internal fraud both in relation to planned 
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governance strategies (Johnston and Shearing 2003) and in their response to detected fraud 
events. The one avoidant rationalisation that does frequently appear in the criminological 
literature is the defence of organisational reputation (Braithwaite and Fisse 1987; Button and 
Gee 2013:28; Levi 1993:6; Ramamoorti et al. 2013:9; Touby 1994; Gottschalk and Tcherni-
Buzzeo 2017). However there is an absence of empirical evidence to support this a priori 
assumption that victims of occupational fraud suffer reputational and consequent financial 
harm. This paper contributes to the existing literature by showing that the avoidant 
attitudes of victims, or more precisely, the avoidant mentalities of those representing the 
victims, are supported by justifications which mirror the crime engagement rationalisations 
verbalised by offenders. The article briefly describes the research methods and then sets out 
the types of justifications expressed by the participants. The theoretical implications both 
support and advance Sutherland’s seminal differential association framework (Sutherland et 
al. 1992).  
 
Methods 
 
Given the lack of directly relevant prior research, the research programme called for a 
qualitative discovery strategy (Denscombe 2010:134). The three core techniques used were 
semi-structured interviews, participant observation and two case studies involving large 
corporations. Occupational fraud was a recurring issue for the participating organisation in 
one of the case studies, DEF Group. The company permitted access to the business in order 
to observe the progress of cases and to examine its fraud prevention methods, structures 
and documentary records including investigation reports. The second case study involved 
participant observation and followed the course of an allegation at R&T Industries, which 
one of the authors was involved with in their then professional role.   
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The semi-structured interviews with the research participants included public sector 
managers, and private sector managers, professional advisors and representatives of law 
enforcement, all based in the UK. The sector breakdown is in Table 1. There was no 
intention that the sample frame would be representative of the population of organisations 
in the UK. The aim was purely to ensure a sensible breadth of perspectives from within and 
without organisations. The problem of access has been well documented, especially when 
the topic is of a sensitive nature (Kalof, Dan and Dietz 2008:116). Participants were 
identified and recruited by accessing informal professional networks, a non-probabilistic 
method that is a recognised approach when access is difficult (Kalof et al. 2008:45). All the 
data was anonymised and coded to identify emergent themes. The research identified a 
range of internal and external organisational factors with respect to the threats, challenges 
and difficulties in tackling occupational fraud. As this article addresses just one of the 
themes, it utilises only a portion of the research observations and the participants’ 
contributions.  
 
Table 1: Participant sample frame 
 
Participant group Quantity 
Private sector - large corporations 12 
Private sector - SMEs 5 
Public sector - government agencies 4 
Public sector - local authorities 2 
Accountancy firms 2 
Total 25 
 
 
Organisations and Occupational Fraud 
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Table 2 lists the relevant participating organisations and includes the types of occupational 
fraud the participants were aware had occurred within their organisations. The list reflects 
the knowledge of the participants, not the total susceptibility of each organisation. Theft and 
bribery appear for two reasons. Firstly, they were reported by the participants. Secondly, 
they sometimes find it difficult to distinguish between fraud and theft, and between fraud 
and bribery. Mark (DEF Group) and Paul (Midhouse BS) pointed out that the theft of cash 
or assets are often disguised by acts of deceit such as the falsification of dockets or the 
manipulation of the business systems. Similarly bribery on the supply side is very often 
accompanied by acts of occupational fraud against the customer (United Nations 2013:25; 
Graycar and Prenzler 2013:101). This type of scheme differs from the classic Cressey 
(1953:30) view of the occupational fraudster because they violate the secrecy condition. In 
these cases the customer’s employee conspires with the supplier to falsely inflate the value 
of contracts in order to fund the bribe. Siemens and other major suppliers used this type of 
scheme in the Iraq Oil-for-Food scandal and elsewhere indicates (US Department of Justice 
2008). It was the most common type of occupational fraud scheme reported by the 
representatives of BBR, Farland Group, Synco Projects and Westco, all in relation to 
construction and engineering works. For shorthand purposes, this article refers to these 
schemes as contract bribery frauds. 
 
The primary rationalisations in Table 2 represent the most significant justifications for not 
tackling occupational fraud expressed in the narratives of the participants. Some of the 
participants verbalised more than one justification and these are indicated as secondary 
rationalisations. Although one cannot be certain which were the most salient in the minds of 
the participants, the primary rationalisations are those which appeared to hold the most 
weight at the time of the fieldwork. Table 3 summarises the frequency of the 
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rationalisations, organised into three groups: protect the interests of the organisation, 
protect the interests of the social group and protect the interests of the individual. The 
normal rationalisation is unique in that it is used as a justification in all three categories. 
 
Six of the participants persuasively described the counter-fraud attitudes and robust 
responses of their employers.  They did not offer any rationalisations for inaction in the face 
of occupational fraud threats. The six ‘no rationalisation’ organisations are indicated in Table 
2. The table also notes which organisations have an anti-bribery policy, an anti-fraud policy 
and a counter-fraud department. The presence of all three elements is a rough indication 
that the organisations are cognisant of fraud threats and have incorporated counter-fraud 
measures into their policies and structures. It is notable that the six ‘no-rationalisation’ 
organisations had all three components in place. 
 
Table 3: Rationalisation frequency 
 
Rationalisation Primary Secondary Total 
Protect interests of the organisation 
Protect business operation 5 2 7 
Protect organisation 
reputation 
2  2 
Insufficient proof  3 3 
Trust  2 2 
Normal  2 2 
Protect interests of the social group 
Empathy 3 1 4 
Social bonds 3  3 
Normal  2 2 
Protect interests of the individual 
Protect career 1 1 2 
Budget control 2  2 
Not responsible  1 1 
Normal 2 1 3 
Total 18 15 33 
None 6  6 
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This paper will now explore each of the rationalisations used in more depth. 
 
Protect the interests of the organisation 
 
Unfettered utilitarianism, which promotes a focus on the overriding social benefit of the 
corporation’s economic purpose, is often held out to be the rationale for permitting 
breaches of societal norms and regulations (Swanson 1995). It justifies the corporate 
characteristics which Braithwaite (1985), Coleman (1992) and Nelken (2007) describe as 
criminogenic. Umphress and Bingham (2011) posited that there can be a dark side to social 
exchange relationships, whereby strong organisational identification and powerful loyalty 
emotions can lead to unethical acts on behalf of the organisation.  This externalised, 
altruistic, higher loyalty (Sykes and Matza 1957) perspective allows those of an otherwise 
moral mind to justify unethical decisions and white-collar criminality on behalf of their 
employers. It can also lead responsible persons to overlook, or even countenance the 
organisation’s victimhood, for fear of undermining productivity, disrupting relationships and 
garnering bad publicity (Holtfreter 2005). The present research encountered four related 
avoidant rationalisations, all of which have the common aim of securing the interests of the 
organisation: protecting the business operations, protecting trust in relationships, protecting 
the organisational reputation and no proof. 
 
Protect business operation 
 
Management in both private and public sector organisations are mindful of the need to 
secure the stability, productivity and service levels of the operations they are responsible 
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for. One of the counter-fraud consultants interviewed for the research observed that for 
many managers, the problem is not the fraud, the problem is the burden and disruptive 
consequences of dealing with it. Lawrence’s contrasting experiences as the Financial 
Director at Hurn Systems and Qintek, both subsidiary divisions of large corporations 
illustrate the seductiveness of the utilitarian perspective. Lawrences’s boss at Hurn, the 
company’s Managing Director, habitually plundered his expense account, even giving two 
company cars to members of his family. When Lawrence aired his concerns with main 
board directors, it became apparent that they were well aware of the abuse. They told 
Lawrence to ignore it because they did not want to risk the division’s performance: 
 
“Providing the subsidiary is contributing to the group, they would rather not 
know. Because they don't see it as a major wrong and it's just a cost of 
operating a business.” 
 
Uncomfortable with a corporate mentality which tolerated such dishonesty, Lawrence left 
Hurn and joined Qintek. He commended his new employer as a “resolute stickler for the 
rules” irrespective of the value of the transgression or the position of the transgressor. He 
described an occasion when a colleague, a sales director was summarily dismissed for 
accepting cash on two occasions for being bumped off business flights. The disruptive 
consequences lead to the loss of contracts in the company’s American market. The ethical 
climate at Qintek placed a far greater value on compliance and discipline than on the 
disruptive consequences of dismissing a senior manager. 
 
Defence of trust 
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Westco is another example where the desire to protect operational performance trumped 
tackling occupational fraud. The company was losing hundreds of thousands of pounds 
annually to contract bribery frauds organised by its engineers in collusion with contractors. 
One contractor, Jeremy, blew the whistle because his refusal to enter into the conspiracy 
was severely harming his business. He sincerely believed that Westco’s management would 
be eager to address the problem, but he was wrong. They refused to investigate the claims 
properly and resisted police investigations. The Operations Director’s defence was: 
 
“We work on trust. We don’t want armies of accountants and investigators 
crawling through the place and innocent people being questioned.” 
 
The company’s management were keen not to disturb the tranquillity of employee 
relationships by accusing staff of corrupt behaviour. As one of the company’s five 
proclaimed values, trust was constantly reinforced through posters, newsletters, videos, 
team briefings and so on. It explains why management were especially concerned that even 
investigating the allegations would render Westco’s core tenets hollow. It is therefore ironic 
that management deployed it again and again as an excuse to avoid furnishing evidence to 
the investigators. It had become a shield for criminality rather than a protection against it. 
Westco’s resistance eventually collapsed when minor actors in the corrupt schemes 
cooperated in return for immunity from prosecution. Reflecting the contract bribery fraud 
methods to their schemes, five people were jailed for fraud and bribery; additionally Westco 
dismissed over twenty employees.  
 
Defence of corporate reputation 
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The one avoidant rationalisation that does frequently arise in the criminological literature is 
the sanctity of corporate reputation (Braithwaite and Fisse 1987; Button and Gee 2013:28; 
Ramamoorti et al. 2013:9; Gottschalk and Tcherni-Buzzeo:2017). Levi (1993:6) refers to the 
stigma involved when people supposedly skilled in looking after their money are defrauded. 
Touby (1994) describes the Judas Effect, whereby embarrassed employers fear the negative 
commercial repercussions by the public exposure of failed management practices. These 
views are founded on an a priori presumption that victimhood causes reputational and 
consequential financial damage, yet there is little supporting empirical evidence. Indeed Levi 
and Sherwin (1989) found that there was no impact. The present research encountered an 
unexpected type of reputational anxiety. 
 
Vendor appraisals are now commonplace business processes, especially within the 
purchasing functions of large public and private sector organisations. Suppliers expect to be 
subjected to these due diligence exercises when securing relationships with new customers. 
Not only are they sensible business practices, they are also a requirement of the Quality 
(ISO9001), Health and Safety (ISO18001) and Environmental (ISO14001) management 
systems. More recently, in response to the introduction of the Public Contracts Regulations 
2006 and the Bribery Act 2010, these appraisal exercises have been supplemented with 
corruption inquiries. Those operating in more heavily regulated markets expect regular, 
annual audits. HIJ Tubeline manufactures health equipment for hospitals. ETS Produce 
manufactures foodstuff. The hygiene and safety critical nature of their products means that 
both companies are subjected to aggressive due diligence by customers in the first place and 
annual audits thereafter. 
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HIJ is typical of many small businesses with a high risk dependency on one large customer, in 
this case the NHS. Managing Director, Terry, firmly believed that the business would be 
destroyed if the NHS become aware of any impropriety within the company, including 
occupational fraud. He was unapologetic in stating that he would never create any adverse 
records of such events for the NHS auditor to query at the annual inspection, and he would 
never risk publicity by calling the police or regulators or by pursuing litigation. Terry’s 
reputational anxieties were heightened because he was pursuing a campaign to expand his 
customer base which meant entertaining more vendor appraisals. These existential fears 
overwhelmed Terry’s strategic thinking causing him to focus on the reputational risks of 
occupational fraud whilst dismissing its direct financial and cultural impact. He used the trust 
defence to dismiss the need for internal fraud policies and procedures “…because trust is 
important here.” It also led him to empathetically overlook falsified overtime and expense 
claims because “…they are a bit like a bonus which helps the guys out when they need it 
and they wouldn’t do it if they didn’t need it.” 
 
The pressures and ethical challenges experienced by Terry are not limited to small 
companies. Robert is the Managing Director ETS Produce, which employs over 1,000 
people. Like HIJ, the company has a small customer base, the major UK food retailers, all of 
which conduct annual audits. He too used the vendor appraisal reputational defence in 
supporting his resolve to hide incidents of occupational fraud or bribery from the gaze of 
the public. He also dismissed occupational fraud as a relatively minor problem handled by 
Human Resources “…with a bit of counselling”, and would never engage the police or other 
external agencies. His generous explanation for his rationale was based on a profound 
experience involving manufacturing standards. 
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ETS diligently recorded all variations in quality standards and consequent management 
actions. On one occasion a “little furry creature” was observed scuttling across the car 
park. The incident and the subsequent investigation, which concluded that the incident was 
an aberration and had not posed a risk to the facilities, were recorded in the pest control 
register. At the first audit following the incident, a customer’s representative inspected the 
register, halted the audit and immediately terminated the supply contract, saying “We can’t 
risk any pests in our [product]”. Robert’s story shows how transparency and resolute 
compliance can be fatal to business relationships. The financial repercussions were a bitter 
lesson for Robert which caused a change in his mind set and in the way he ran the company. 
He ordered the destruction of the pest records and suppressed reporting of hygiene 
incidents. He was clearly uncomfortable with the erosion of the company’s values and the 
adjustment in his ethical role identity, but he felt he had no choice.  
 
Both of the cases presented here illustrate how the legislation and standards designed to 
improve governance and to tackle corruption has ironically encouraged the suppression of 
events, dishonesty at the commencement of business relationships and above all the 
utilitarian determination to avoid the authorities. The reasons laid out by both managers 
were based on real pressures and experiences and resulted from a considered, rational 
choice calculus. 
 
Insufficient proof – the proof ratchet 
 
Sometimes a manager’s first thought when receiving a fraud complaint is that the 
complainant must have an ulterior motive, that the complaint is a proxy for some other 
form of grievance. The group identity activates and triggers defensive behaviour, especially 
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when the complainant is an external, out-group party (Tajfel 1982). Defensive suspicions are 
particularly strong when the complainant is a supplier alleging a contract bribery fraud. Paul, 
a building society counter-fraud manager, characterised it as the supplier “committing 
suicide”. 
 
This appears to be a common reaction. Even the counter-fraud team at DEF Group, which 
thrives on whistleblower reports, are initially wary: “It's usually because they've lost a 
contract and somebody else has got it so they're a bit suspicious about why they've lost it”. 
The typical corporate solution is to demand evidence to justify the internal inquiries. Such 
was Ethan’s initial reaction to allegations of contract bribery fraud at R&T: “How do you 
know this? What evidence have you got? You can't go accusing people without evidence.” 
Denial of crime is easy without supporting evidence and very convenient when business 
protection and reputational concerns are in mind. In the R&T case, Ethan initially refused to 
entertain the complaints. It was only after the accusers had undertaken an investigation and 
presented him with compelling evidence that he took the allegations seriously. 
 
Similarly Westco refused to accept the merits of the complaints from their supplier. Fearful 
of the consequences of refusing to conspire with Westco’s employees in contract bribery 
frauds, and nervous of making accusations, Jeremy organised his complaint with supporting 
evidence which showed how the conspiracy worked: “I just wanted to hand it over to them 
so they could deal with it.” However Westco’s management were unimpressed and 
demanded more evidence to justify an investigation: “It’s not proof. We need proof and you 
don’t have it.” Jeremy set about finding more proof, but each time he presented his 
accumulating evidence it was rejected as inadequate: “And that’s what they kept doing: 
every time we offered more evidence they’d raise the high bar.” Desperate and in 
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exasperation, Jeremy called the police and handed over the evidence which proved sufficient 
to convict five offenders. The total value of the Westco’s fraud losses that its management 
tried to hide was at least £2.6million. The harm caused to honest suppliers is inestimable. 
The proof ratchet mechanism, whereby management crank up the evidentiary standards 
required to even engage in a proper investigation, is a powerful and convenient defence 
against all but the most resilient complainants. 
 
Protect the interests of the social group 
The second set of reasons for not dealing with fraud relate to protecting the interests of the 
social group.  
Empathy 
 
The difficult circumstances of offenders are principal motivations (Cressey 1953) and 
defence of necessity rationalisations (Sykes and Matza 1957). They can also induce 
empathetic responses in those representing victim organisations. We saw earlier how Terry 
appeared empathetic towards employees who committed minor payroll and expense frauds. 
Paul, the Counter-Fraud Manager of Midhouse Building Society displayed a similar attitude. 
He explained at length how the company deals with external application frauds and was 
demonstrative in his visceral contempt for street criminals and mortgage fraudsters: “What 
we really want, and let's be honest about it, we want to see these people put in 
stocks….and jeer at them.” His attitude was probably shaped by his years as a police officer. 
However, when asked about the company’s occupational fraud policies, it became clear that 
the organisation had little, if any, experience of dealing with occupational fraud: his narrative 
shifted quickly from explanations of what the company might do in such cases to avoidant 
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justifications. He had far greater empathy with those of his own social background, the 
white-collar worker: 
 
“They are very decent people who are not going to be a burden on this 
society. What I'm saying is that the punishment for that type of crime is 
blighting the wrong people…..…the person who works in a financial institute 
or a commercial industry and falls by the wayside because her teenage son 
needs a pair of designer trainers and she thinks she will do the teeming and 
lading.” 
 
This type of avoidant rationalisation is a form of higher loyalty rationalisation which 
expresses identification and empathy with a broad social group rather than to an 
organisation, a close-knit community or to specific persons. It reflected the strength of 
Paul’s social identity and his distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’. Feeling the need to bolster 
his ethical role identity and the morality of his views, Paul then added a secondary, fraud is 
normal excuse (Benson 1985): 
 
“People are kidding themselves if they think you've got people that are morally 
trained, so morally conscious that ‘I couldn't possibly do that, oh no.’ They do. 
Are we going to arrest them all? No. Who’d be left standing?” 
 
Similarly, two participants, Alec and Keegan, who worked for large companies in the 
construction industry described how empathetic rationalisations at the supplier interface 
both enable fraudsters and promote unchallenged tolerance of their activities. In these 
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cases, the supplier seeks excessive payments for contract variations and the client’s 
representative receives a share of the proceeds. 
 
“With contractors beaten up on prices, they reckon it's [contract bribery fraud] 
helping them [the supplier] get the right price and [the client’s employee] getting a 
bit of reward for helping them....To some extent there's truth in it, contractors 
are not paid enough, so when someone makes the right offer, you take it.”   
[Alec] 
 
Keegan characterised it as a commonplace cultural phenomenon, a negotiation played out 
time and again within the industry and hidden in the contingency line of project budgets. It is 
a game in which the ultimate client, sitting at the apex of a complex network of equipment 
suppliers, contractors and consultants, naively picks up the bill. 
 
“They're bound to fudge the costs and variations to cover the risks and make it 
up [sales turnover] anyway they can. They have to do deals with the QSs and 
project managers to get the variations approved. Then the QS fudges the cost 
and the main contractor fudges the cost and the client, who hasn't got a clue, 
ends up paying for it. That's how the game goes.”   [Keegan] 
 
The construction industry typically relies on detailed supply contracts running into hundreds 
of pages to manage complex supply arrangements. The purpose is to cover all risks and 
possible eventualities by clearly delineating the responsibilities of the trade suppliers. They 
also set out at length the mechanisms for dealing with the dreaded contract variations, the 
unforeseen circumstances which require additional supplies and services. The size, detail and 
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complexity of the contractual arrangements may well give the ultimate client and the 
principal contractor comfort, but in complexity and comfort there is opacity and 
complacency, characteristics feared by safety experts because they conceal lurking dangers 
(Reason, 2000). Successful gamers in the construction industry exploit complexity, opacity, 
complacency and a toleration of entitlement rationalisations (Mars 1973) to address 
perceived inequities by fraudulent means. Those who know how to play the game well 
prosper, the rest fall by the wayside. 
 
Social bonds 
 
Social bond avoidant rationalisations are similar to the empathy class of rationalisations 
except they are stimulated by the strength of relationships with specific persons rather than 
identification with a broad social group. Brezina and Azimi (2017) emphasise the role of 
peer loyalty in adolescent delinquency. Free and Murphy (2015) observed similar affective 
bonds between co-offenders in fraudulent groups. The difference is that the second parties 
in the present cases are acquiescent line managers and reluctant witnesses.  John Hughes, a 
colleague of UBS rogue trader, Kweku Adoboli, famously failed to inform the bank’s 
management that Adoboli repeatedly exceeded his financial trading limits because "I went to 
a school where people didn't grass"  (BBC 2012). Had Hughes put aside his puerile code of 
honour, the bank may have saved the bank £1.4billion. On a much smaller scale, Hamish, a 
supplier to Westco, was well-aware of the corrupt schemes used to fraudulently extract 
money from the company. He was familiar with the mechanisms, understood the harm it 
caused and profoundly disapproved. Nevertheless he could not bring himself to snitch on 
people who had over the years become friends because it had become so common that it 
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was perceived as normal business practice and because “…when it's someone you've 
worked with for a long time, get on with, that's different, hard.” 
 
Brian is a financial auditor, working for a large audit firm. He spoke of a particular taboo in 
the industry called “phantom ticking” whereby auditors falsely tick audit tests as passed 
when they have either failed or not been inspected at all. The practice is, according to Brian, 
easy to spot at subsequent audits. The practice deceives the audit firm, the client, the 
client’s investors and any other party relying on the quality of the financial audits, yet Brian 
would never grass on his colleagues. 
 
The strength of social bonds is most obvious in small family businesses. The husband and 
wife owners of SW Marketing, repeatedly excused their son’s fraudulent use of the 
company’s credit card to finance an excessive lifestyle. After years of second chances, he 
was eventually dismissed when Iain, the Marketing Director, and the Finance Director 
exhausted their patience and threatened to resign. Iain reckoned it saved the company 
£150,000 per year. 
 
Protect the interests of the individual 
The third set of rationalisations relate to protecting the interests of the individual.  
Protect career 
 
One reason that managers may fear the exposure of fraud and other illegalities within their 
departments is that it will reflect poorly on them and threaten their prospects (Friedrichs, 
2010:243). Such concerns coloured Terry’s view of occupational fraud. He had previously 
worked for Cardwell, a very large facilities management company with a robust counter-
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fraud structure. A member of his staff had perpetrated a substantial fraud against the 
company over a number of months before fleeing to Africa. Terry and his project 
accountant were blamed for the fraud and both were forced to resign. 
 
Ethan, the Engineering Manager at R&T Industries, faced a similar dilemma. Ethan was a 
young manager, about 30. He had joined the company just two years earlier and was keen 
to build a reputation to further his career. He was under significant pressure to introduce 
business critical projects speedily and at the lowest cost. His first reaction to suppliers 
reporting contract bribery fraud within his department was to deflect the accusations by 
engaging the proof ratchet. However when presented with substantial evidence, Ethan took 
the material to his line manager, who passed him on to the Engineering Director, who 
referred him to the head of Human Resources. Despite having no skills or experience in 
dealing with angry suppliers and corrupt personnel, the HR director asked Ethan to conduct 
his own investigation. The company provided no support nor sought out any professional 
assistance. The directors refused to meet the suppliers who had made the complaints. They 
preferred to burden Ethan with the task of explaining the company’s position to the 
suppliers. It was well rehearsed but the crafted narrative was quickly replaced by a defence 
of necessity self-justification (Minor 1981):  
 
 “HR consulted legal and they have considered it and thank you for your 
assistance in this matter but they say you don't have sufficient evidence to 
justify dismissing [supplier] and [employee] in the middle of the 
project…..They've basically left it to me to decide what to do. So this is what 
we're going to do. We have agreed that once [the project] is finished we'll let 
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him go and we won't use [supplier] again, but we've got to finish it, if we're to 
push back delivery again, I'll lose my job.” 
 
The employee and the supplier were indeed dismissed at the end of the project, but not 
before they had relieved R&T of £150,000 in fraudulent payments. At this point Ethan was 
more eloquent in his criticism of the events, accusing the directors of paying more attention 
to their reputations and corporate careers than to the needs of the business. They also lost 
the confidence of Ethan who, bitter at being forced to compromise his values in order to 
keep his job, pursued his career elsewhere. 
 
One consequence of this defensive behaviour, whether learned directly or vicariously, is 
that lawyers are sometimes frustrated by uncooperative line managers because, as barrister 
Nazim observed: “They can be somewhat revisionist as to how the frauds occurred.” 
Defensive strategies can cause managers to abandon, at least temporarily, their corporate 
role identities so that even their roles as witnesses are compromised. Solicitor, Barry, 
described the consequences when a manager, duped by an employee who was feeding a 
gambling habit, strove unnecessarily to protect his position by lying to the investigators: 
 
“We spent a lot of time and costs on working out why he [the manager] was 
telling lies. All the time we had to test what he was telling us to work out, 
when he was in the witness box, what the result would be. So we were 
spending more time testing what we did not believe to be true.” 
 
Not my responsibility 
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The senior management team in the R&T case determined that a critical business need 
superseded the need for a thorough investigation of the corruption allegations (higher 
loyalty rationalisation). With a keen eye on their own careers (defence of necessity), they 
also collectively distanced themselves from the toxicity of allegations and delegated the 
burden to a junior manager (denial of responsibility). In turn, Ethan denied responsibility for 
tolerating the corrupt scheme by blaming the senior management team. Criminality thrived 
in the ensuing vacuum. 
 
The diffusion of responsibility is an easy response when policies and expectations are poorly 
defined and weakly enacted: it allows employees to hide behind their ignorance and 
deliberately keep themselves uninformed (Kaptein 2008). It is a problem that one counter-
fraud specialist, sees more frequently in the public sector: 
 
“In the public sector you get more, ‘That bit’s not in my department.’ The 
accountability gets spread, controls are over there, systems are over here, 
that's a bit of IT. It dissipates as does the blame.….. I’ve been called into public 
sector frauds that were known about and gone on for months and months and 
months, even from the point of disclosure; it’s just not got round to actually 
investigating it…it just rattles around....People say, ‘It's part of the budget, it's 
nothing, it's nothing. These things happen.’” 
 
Malign influence of the budget 
 
Button (2011) asserts that the malign influence of KPI (key performance indicators) enables 
police officers to rationalise not taking on fraud cases. One of the most important KPIs in 
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any organisation is the financial performance relative to its budget. It is evidence of 
managers’ ability to control their departments and frequently involves bonus incentives, 
even in non-profit public bodies (CIPD 2010). Very often budgetary control involves the 
transactional management technique of management by exception (Bass and Steidlmeier 
1999) so that departmental expenditure is only scrutinised if it exceeds the target set at the 
start of the financial year. These conditions place managers under significant pressure to 
maximise their budgets in the first place and then to focus their efforts on variations to 
budget. It also means that low level frauds which do not impact on those budgets with 
adequate headroom are unlikely to trigger inquiries. As one fraud consultant observed: 
 
“Managers are set budgets, meet their targets, where's the problem? If you 
introduce fraud detection, they then have a problem they didn't have before 
and they've now got to address it.” 
 
Dismissing occupational fraud in this way is a denial of injury rationalisation (Sykes and 
Matza 1957) which enables the avoidance of disruptive investigations, protects their 
personal reputations and secures their financial clout, a primary source of their personal 
power. The corollary problem is that fraud losses are unwittingly incorporated into 
superficially prepared incremental budgets (ICSA 2005:210). Emma is a Security Officer in a 
government department. One of her principal grievances was that line management paid 
little attention to the spending of personnel and were unconcerned about their fraudulent 
activities provided they did not exceed their budget limits.  She described a case involving a 
vehicle fleet manager whose fraudulent activities were tolerated until a cost-cutting budget 
forced management into action: 
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 “He regularly purchased cars for himself, family and friends. When he wanted a 
change he just bought another car. He never bought a car or any petrol for 10 
years [using his own money]. He even had private number plates… Management 
don't check what they're doing provided the employee is getting on with their 
job, not causing any hassle.” 
 
A peculiarity of the traditional annually fixed budgeting process is that surpluses cannot be 
carried forward and any under-spend automatically decrements subsequent budgets (ICSA 
2005;210). In the worst cases the fear of this resource constraining mechanism can shift 
governance mentality from acquiescence to the positive encouragement of fraud. One 
Project Manager, Oliver who works for a city borough, described how the council’s 
infrastructure management normalises occupational fraud in order to protect budget 
allocations: 
 
 “We have to make sure our fees for projects are at budget. We submit our 
fees schedule and it's signed off when we start the job. But it makes no 
difference if we do better because we spend the money anyway, not like the 
contractors. And it makes no difference because we have to spend it. If we 
don't spend it, we won't get the money budgeted next year so guys are told to 
rack up the overtime after six o’clock, to come back at weekends. We don't 
need them but it gets to the budget.” 
 
 
Fraud is normal 
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A theme recurring throughout the analysis is the perception that fraud is a normal, 
commonplace activity. It appeared in the research on eight occasions as either a primary or 
supporting avoidant rationalisation. Alec and Keegan described the frauds carried out in 
collusion with suppliers as expected business practice. The building society manager, Paul, 
regarded it as a forgivable offence perpetrated by virtually everyone. Hamish viewed it as 
normal within Westco. Hamish refused to snitch on his friends at Westco, including Project 
Manager Carson. Carson was one of the minor players in the fraud schemes offered 
immunity from prosecution in return for their cooperation. He was stunned when the 
scandal erupted because he saw it as an everyday activity tolerated by Westco’s 
management and cultural norms: “The shock was, not what was going on, but they did 
something about it. It had been going on forever and everyone knew.” If Jeremy or another 
aggrieved party had not complained, the practice would have continued unchecked. 
 
In separate interviews Ursula and Luke described the development of the culture at RTA-
UK, a government agency. Prior to the 1990s the organisation’s employees regularly took 
advantage of healthy funding, weak controls and management indifference to such an extent 
that fraud and bribery were regarded as normal employee benefits. It led to an enquiry and 
the restructuring of the agency. Rigorous compliance policies and controls were introduced 
that bore down on the corrupt activities whilst reforming cultural values. It took over 10 
years for the culture to change. Much of the inertia was due to the legacy attitudes of long-
serving employees who were replaced through natural turnover. One could describe this 
normalisation journey as evolutionary differential association from a criminogenic sub-
culture to a compliance orientated ethical climate (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran 1999). 
However the senior civil servants leading the reform were woefully remiss in neglecting to 
include all areas of the agency. The RTA-Europe site in Germany continued to be bedevilled 
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by corruption, especially contract bribery fraud. Suspicions were reported and concerns 
raised by compliance auditors, but they were dismissed due to insufficient proof. Like the 
Westco case, it took a specific, substantiated complaint to trigger an external investigation 
which led to the prosecution of a number of the agency’s employees and suppliers. 
 
A particular feature of the normal rationalisation in the research was the difficulty in 
distinguishing between the innocents who were excusing the behaviour of others and those 
who were justifying their own offending. Straightforward bribery was tolerated, for example, 
by the junior management within a division of GoStat, a government agency, because the 
managers shared the modest benefits of the schemes arranged by their staff: they attended 
the social events funded by the corrupt money. The management of Inzco, the UK division 
of a major heavy plant manufacturer, went further by encouraging contract bribery fraud 
schemes because that was standard industry practice, protected the interests of the 
company and was not really a crime: 
 
“We find out what his wife wants: car, holiday, whatever. And we do a deal. If 
we can, we stick his cost on the job, what we can, but it depends what we can 
get away with, what his budget is like. It's just doing what you need to. A bit 
under the table, you know [palm down, Peter gestures towards the floor]. It's not 
really wrong, not like it's a crime, it just helps everyone along to get the deal 
done. It's part of the package you put together, isn't it?......Yes [it’s commonplace 
in the sector], at [company A and B], I worked for them before, it was just the 
same. The product has to be right, the price needs to be good and the client 
should get something out of it so the whole package is right. Why? Do you 
have a problem with it? You'll go nowhere if you don't.” 
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The normal rationalisation appears to be the justification which most strongly indicates a 
dysfunctional ethical climate wherein an organisation is more likely to be either a victim or a 
perpetrator of corrupt crimes. Ashforth and Anand’s (2003) literature review followed 
Sutherland’s differential association theory (Sutherland et al. 1992:88) to posit that three 
processes underlie the normalisation of corporate corruption: institutionalisation, 
rationalisation and socialisation. By extension, these cultural processes are equally applicable 
to occupational crimes. Furthermore, wherever occupational crimes are normalised, those 
who do not perpetrate the crimes are more likely to view them as tolerable practices. The 
perception that fraud and bribery are ordinary, mundane activities is thus a strong antidote 
to the toxicity of the criminal label. It is ubiquitous in the sense that it occurs in situations 
where offenders and those forgiving the offenders have in mind the benefits to the 
organisation, concerns for the social group, personal interests, or a combination of all three. 
 
 
No-rationalisation organisations 
 
Although six of the organisations are recorded as not constructing avoidant rationalisations, 
it is important to note that these results reflect the research observations and the views of 
the participants. It is quite possible that the results would have been different had the 
research captured the views of other members of the same organisations. One can imagine, 
for example, that a collection of chief executives would represent the conditions of their 
organisations in a more positive light than more junior employees. Similarly it would be 
foolish to generalise a conclusion that the presence or absence of counter-fraud 
proclamations and policies is an indicator of either a truly progressive organisation which 
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refuses to rationalise occupational fraud or a regressive organisation which tolerates it. Too 
often such policies are vacuous techniques of impression management rather than 
reflections of genuine ethical ambitions and normative values (Weaver, Trevino and 
Cochran 1999). 
 
Nicole, the Counter-fraud Manager at Midton District Council, illustrated the intolerance of 
her organisation to employee fraud despite the tensions that can be stimulated by natural 
human feelings. Nicole dealt with a case involving a single mother:  
 
 “Yes, it's awful really. We're not out here to hang people. There's a human 
being at the end of all this. And you do have to take all that into context…… 
It's the children as well. You know, she has got herself into a pickle and it's just 
compounded.” 
 
Nevertheless Nicole put aside the evident empathy she felt for the offender. She did not 
waver from her role identity and eschew her responsibilities for the council. She pursued a 
full set of parallel sanctions: dismissal from the council, a successful criminal prosecution and 
compensation through an attachment of earnings order. 
 
The case study involving DEF Group provided the opportunity to examine its counter-fraud 
structures and performance, in particular the attitude of the company’s management to 
utilitarian rationalisations. DEF is an international manufacturing and distribution 
corporation. Its substantial UK division distributes building products throughout the 
country. The structural core of the UK division’s counter-fraud strategy is the Security 
Department which reports directly to the main board. The department’s priorities include 
Page 32 of 47 
 
occupational frauds and sales frauds perpetrated by its trade customers. The department 
has developed a comprehensive suite of management policies, procedures and training 
programmes. It also actively monitors compliance and conducts investigations which lead to 
disciplinary, civil and criminal sanctions. In all cases investigation reports are prepared and 
shared with the main board. 
 
The company’s internal investigators prepare progress and final reports in all of their cases. 
The results and recommendations of investigations can create tensions between the ethical 
aims of the Security Department and the performance ambitions of operational managers. 
The Security Department wants to rid the company of all rotten apples and, whenever 
possible, to pursue legal sanctions. On the other hand operational managers sometimes 
adopt a utilitarian approach and construct ‘protect business operation’ rationalisations: they 
occasionally try to negotiate alternative outcomes so that they can forgive and retain 
valuable employees. The Security Department deals with such resistance by firstly 
dismantling line managers’ utilitarian avoidant rationalisations and emphasising the salience of 
ethical values. Any residual resistance is defused by raising the prospect of censure by the 
company’s leadership: 
 
“It gets back to corporate pretty soon and there's plenty of guys in the Execs, 
my boss is the FD and he would start jumping on heads if we wanted to keep a 
fraudster in the business. The CEO is very, very clear with us. We keep saying 
we do well with tone from the top messages. It is quite clear from those sort 
of guys.” 
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The diligent reporting methods not only expose aberrant behaviour, they also lay bare the 
rationale for management decisions. Perhaps this is the true meaning and test of the oft 
quoted phrase ‘tone from the top’ (Holloway 2012), that the leaders dig in their heels and 
refuse to accept any excuses or rationalisations for employee fraud. The firm approach, 
which is blind to the status of the employee, does not cure all ills.  However, it led to the 
dismissal, prosecution of a Marketing Director found to be the principal actor in a £850,000 
contract bribery fraud scheme, and the recovery of all losses. It also led to the steady 
reduction in measured annual occupational fraud losses from £800,000 to £200,000. 
 
 
Discussion and Conclusion  
 
A dominant theme emerging from the research is that the prospect of tackling occupational 
fraud stimulates greater anxieties than the frauds themselves. For some managers these 
anxieties arise from experience which has taught them that exposing fraud or similar 
compliance issues can be painful. For others it may be a general fear of the unknown and the 
unquantifiable. This research observed and reported rational choice calculations to do 
nothing based on a balance of negatives. Managers avoid the pro-active prevention of 
occupational fraud and turn a blind-eye to detected incidents unless circumstances dictate 
that the negative consequences of avoiding the problem outweigh the negative 
consequences of addressing it. These circumstances include higher than ‘normal’ fraud 
losses, the obviousness of frauds and the active intervention of an external agency, such as 
senior management or an effective counter-fraud department. 
 
Page 34 of 47 
 
The feared consequences can be broadly divided into three interacting categories: 
consequences to the employing organisations, consequences to social groups which 
intersect the organisations and consequences to the individuals. Following Lowell (2012), 
when these fears are sufficiently salient in the minds of managers and colleagues, they induce 
the construction of rationalisations to moderate the moral dissonance stimulated by their 
choice to avoid tackling corrupt behaviours. These avoidant rationalisations mirror the 
crime engagement rationalisations constructed by fraudsters as set out in Table 4. Just as 
the offender rationalisations can be divided approximately into externalised and internalised 
justifications, one can also separate the avoidant rationalisations. The organisational and 
social group rationalisations centre on the altruistic consideration of others. The 
rationalisations connected to the protection of the individual arise from selfish concerns.  
 
Table 4: Equivalence of avoidant and engagement rationalisations 
 
 
Victim avoidant 
rationalisation 
Equivalent 
offender 
engagement 
rationalisation 
Protect 
organisation 
Protect business operation 
Higher loyalty 
Protect organisation 
reputation 
Insufficient proof 
Trust 
Protect social 
group 
Empathy 
Social bonds 
Protect individual 
Protect career Defence of necessity 
Budget control Denial of injury 
Not responsible 
Denial of 
responsibility 
Normal Normal 
 
Whether the reasons for not dealing with fraud inside organisations are called excuses, 
justifications, apologies (Benson 1985), motivations (Coleman 1992) or accounts 
(Goldstraw-White 2012) is immaterial to this analysis. Indeed, the reasons that managers 
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choose to tolerate occupational fraud in some circumstances may be regarded as justifiable 
utilitarian solutions to difficult dilemmas. In a similar way, one can also sympathise with the 
predicaments and defence of necessity rationalisations of a mother who engage in fraud in 
order to protect the welfare of her children (Daly 1989; Zietz 1981). However, like Nicole 
at Midton District Council, this analysis avoids such value judgements because to do so 
would deny the objective observations concerning self-justification in the context of 
unethical acts. The germane point is that managers use the same rationalisations as 
occupational offenders, at times mixing a befuddling cocktail of self-justifications, in order to 
maintain their perception of themselves as responsible, moral persons. In this sense, we 
might borrow from John Stuart Mill and say: “Bad men need nothing more to compass their 
ends, than that good men should look on and rationalise doing nothing.” 
 
Sutherland advised us that people become criminals because of their exposure to a sub-
culture wherein the definitions favourable to the violation of law are in excess of the 
definitions unfavourable to the violation of the law (Sutherland et al. 1992:89). Sutherland’s 
teaching is constructed from the perspective of nascent offenders and their dominant 
association with others in sub-cultures where criminality is promoted. In the employment 
context we can supplement the differential association theory by placing greater emphasis 
on the role of the victim organisation and its members: 
 
Employees are more likely to become occupational fraudsters when the victim 
organisation’s rationalisations for not enforcing the law are in excess in type 
and frequency of the organisation’s reasons for enforcing the law. 
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By connecting the acquiescent rationalisations of the victim organisation with the 
motivations of the fraudster, we can also say: 
 
Employees are more likely to become occupational fraudsters when the victim 
organisation’s rationalisations for not enforcing the law are in excess in type 
and frequency of the fraudster’s rationalisations favourable to fraud. 
 
The more that the victim organisation rationalises excusing occupational fraud in both 
frequency and type compared to its reasons for tackling the problem, the more fraudgenic 
the climate may become. We can call this condition regressive differential rationalisation. It 
weakens the prevailing ethical standards and diminishes the fraudsters’ need to 
psychologically rationalise their criminality. Under these conditions the organisation’s 
avoidant rationalisations are in excess of the offender’s crime engagement rationalisations. A 
regressive differential rationalisation climate foments a passive tolerance to the 
organisation’s own victimhood. It is an invitation for occasional offenders to supplement 
their earnings and is a ripe opportunity for sociopaths to get rich. Borrowing from safety 
literature (Reason 2000), regressive differential rationalisation is akin to a resident pathogen, 
a hidden, lurking danger which weakens the organisation’s resilience to occupational fraud. 
 
Cressey (1986) refers to Sutherland in suggesting that “…in the long run, the incidence of 
management fraud will decline only as neutralizing verbalizations supporting these crimes 
are themselves neutralized.” The differential rationalisation theory presented here informs 
us that organisations’ security governance strategies will be more successful if they first 
concentrate on systematically deconstructing the avoidant rationalisations of managers and 
employees. By doing so, the organisation develops a progressive differential rationalisation 
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climate that promotes the salience of group identity (Stryker and Burke 2000) and the 
meanings of an ethical role identity (Weaver and Trevino 1999), one that is intolerant of 
fraud irrespective of any relationship with the offender or the context of the offence. It 
reduces the risk of law-abiding excusers slipping silently into excusing their own emergent 
criminality. It ensures that pathologically immoral offenders are held accountable 
irrespective of their station. 
 
By focusing on the justifications organisations construct for tolerating fraud, differential 
rationalisation addresses one aspect of the context and pathway to occupational fraud. It is 
an addendum to Sutherland’s differential association theory that accommodates Cressey’s 
lone embezzler operating in secret whilst also recognising the influence of fraudgenic 
organisations which acquiesce to their own victimhood. Differential rationalisation may be 
equally applicable to other white-collar crimes and ethical concepts involving organisations 
and sub-cultures, including circumstances where the organisation is not the direct victim, for 
example issues such as health and safety, environmental responsibility and equality. A 
progressive differential rationalisation climate signals to staff and other stakeholders the 
legitimacy of speaking up and is thereby more likely to reduce inhibitions to do so. It is also 
more likely to engender transparency rather than cover-ups and thus promote valuable 
isomorphic learning arising from negative experiences and catastrophic events (Toft and 
Reynolds 2005: 65). On the other hand, regressive differential rationalisation cultures are 
more likely to lose the value of learning opportunities by excusing the circumstanced and 
those responsible for immoral, negligent or reckless behaviour and therefore lose those 
valuable learning opportunities. 
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This article has set out some of the findings of a discovery research programme which 
investigated organisational inhibitions in relation to the prevention of occupational fraud. 
One of the emergent themes was the frequency and range of rationalisations which are 
constructed by representatives of organisational victims to justify not tackling occupational 
fraud. These rationalisations bore great similarity to the rationalisations constructed by 
offenders. The paper offers a theory of differential rationalisation as an addendum to 
Sutherland’s differential association theory. Organisations of all types, whether private, 
public or charitable, are more fraudgenic and appealing to occupational fraudsters wherever 
their avoidant rationalisations exceed their reasons for tackling fraud and are in excess of 
the offenders’ rationalisations for committing fraud. The results and ideas presented are 
based on a discovery research methodology, therefore the topic would benefit from further, 
targeted research. Of particular interest would be investigations into whether and how 
occupational roles, social identities and organisational ethical values influence the frequency 
and type of avoidant rationalisations. 
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Table 2: Schedule of organisations and participants 
Organisation Service Employees Participant Role 
Occupational 
fraud types 
Primary 
rationalisation 
Secondary 
rationalisation 
Bribery Fraud 
C/F 
dept 
AGov 
Government 
agency 
10,000+ Emma 
Security 
Officer 
Purchasing fraud Budget control      
BBR Facilities mgt 
5,000-
10,000 
Ewan 
Counter-
fraud 
Manager 
Payroll fraud, 
purchasing fraud, 
bribery, theft 
No 
rationalisation 
     
Cardwell FM Manufacturer 10,000+ Terry A 
Operations 
Director 
Purchasing fraud 
No 
rationalisation 
     
DEF Group Distribution 10,000+ Mark 
Security 
Manager 
Payroll fraud, 
accounts fraud, 
purchasing fraud, 
bribery, theft 
No 
rationalisation 
     
Eastown DC 
Local 
authority 
1,000-5,000 Oliver 
Project 
Manager 
Payroll fraud 
encouraged by 
management 
Budget control      
Elam Sports Sports club 10-100 Kyle 
Training 
Director 
Use of club assets 
for private 
business 
Social bonds   X X X 
ETS Produce Manufacturer 1,000-5,000 Robert 
Managing 
Director 
Minor payroll 
fraud 
Company 
reputation 
   X X 
Farland Group Construction 10,000+ Alec 
Contracts 
Manager 
Purchasing fraud, 
bribery 
Empathy Normal  X X 
HIJ Tubeline Engineering 10-100 Terry B 
Managing 
Director 
Payroll fraud 
Company 
reputation 
Empathy, trust, 
protect career 
X X X 
Hurn Group Manufacturer 10,000+ Lawrence A 
Finance 
Director 
Purchasing fraud, 
expense fraud 
Business 
operation 
   X X 
I4U 
Computers 
InfoTech 10-100 Norman 
Managing 
Director 
Payroll fraud, 
accounts fraud, 
bribery 
Business 
operation 
  X X X 
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Organisation Service Employees Participant Role 
Occupational 
fraud types 
Primary 
rationalisation 
Secondary 
rationalisation 
Bribery Fraud 
C/F 
dept 
Inzco Manufacturer 10,000+ Peter 
Sales 
Executive 
Bribery 
Business 
operation 
Normal  X X 
Midhouse BS 
Building 
Society 
10,000+ Paul 
Counter-
fraud 
Manager 
Payroll fraud, 
purchasing fraud, 
petty cash theft 
Empathy 
Business 
operation, 
normal 
   
Midton DC 
Local 
authority 
1,000-5,000 Nicole 
Counter-
fraud 
Manager 
Payroll fraud, 
benefit fraud 
No 
rationalisation 
     
Qintek 
Industries 
Manufacturer 10,000+ Lawrence B 
Finance 
Director 
Expense fraud 
No 
rationalisation 
     
R&T 
Industries 
Manufacturer 10,000+ Ethan 
Engineering 
Manager 
Purchasing fraud, 
bribery 
Protect career 
Business 
operation, not 
responsible, 
insufficient 
proof 
  X 
RTA-Europe 
Government 
agency 
5,000-
10,001 
Ursula 
Compliance 
Manager 
Payroll fraud, 
purchasing fraud, 
bribery, theft 
Normal 
Insufficient 
proof 
   
RTA-UK 
Government 
agency 
5,000-
10,000 
Ursula, Luke 
Compliance 
Manager, 
Project 
Manager 
Payroll fraud, 
purchasing fraud, 
bribery, theft 
No 
rationalisation 
     
SW Marketing Marketing 10-100 Iain 
Marketing 
Director 
Payroll fraud, 
purchasing fraud 
Social bonds   X X X 
Synco Construction 100-500 Keegan 
Contracts 
Manager 
Purchasing fraud, 
bribery 
Empathy Normal  X X 
Wendever 
Accountancy 
firm 
1,000-5,000 Brian Auditor 
False audit 
practices 
Social bonds     X 
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Organisation Service Employees Participant Role 
Occupational 
fraud types 
Primary 
rationalisation 
Secondary 
rationalisation 
Bribery Fraud 
C/F 
dept 
Westco Manufacturer 10,000+ 
Clive, 
Carson, 
Hamish, 
Jeremy 
Operations 
Director, 
Project 
Manager, 
Supplier 
Project 
Manager, 
Supplier 
MD 
Purchasing fraud, 
bribery 
Business 
operation 
Trust, 
insufficient 
proof, normal 
 X X 
GoStat 
Government 
agency 
1,000-5,000 Thomas 
Operations 
Manager 
Bribery Normal      
Smiths & Co 
Accountancy 
firm 
10-100 Tim Auditor Payroll fraud 
Business 
operation 
    X 
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